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ARTICLE

BIANNUAL SURVEY

14-

ACTIONS

BErWEEN JOINT TORT-FEAsoRs

CPLR 1401, relating to contribution among joint tort-feasors,
not circumvented by one defendant's taking assignment of
plaintiff's judgment against other defendant.
In a negligence action, plaintiffs had judgment against Central
Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Dorp Motors, Inc. Central appealed;
Dorp did not. The judgment was reversed as to Central and remanded for a new trial. Before the new trial Central settled with
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs assigned to Central their outstanding judgment against Central's co-tort-feasor, Dorp. The Greyhound Corporation succeeded to Central. A judgment of contribution had been
procured against Dorp's insurer, and Greyhound brought suit on that
judgment; it also brought an action to recover as assignee of
plaintiffs' judgment against
Dorp. The court of appeals held that
114
neither suit would lie.
The purported judgment of contribution was invalid. CPLR
1401 is narrow and permits contribution only when there is an
outstanding judgment against two (at least) joint tort-feasors. The
reversal as to Central meant that, when Central settled before the
new trial, there was no joint judgment outstanding against both
Central and Dorp. Moreover, the payment Central made to plaintiffs was one in settlement, and not payment of a judgment plaintiffs held against Central. In such circumstances prior case law
made clear that contribution would not lie under what is now
CPLR 1401.115
The assignment to Central (in whose shoes Greyhound now
stood as successor) of plaintiffs' judgment against Dorp was held,
in effect, to be a subterfuge to avoid the limitations on contribution imposed by CPLR 1401, and hence could give rise to no
rights that Central would not have been entitled to under CPLR
1401 itself.
ARTICLE

20-

MISTAKES,

DEFECTS,

EXTENSIONS

IRREGULARITIES

AND

OF TIME

Execution's captioning out of civil court instead of supreme
court held jurisdictional defect.
Plaintiff recovered a judgment against defendant on May 28.
A transcript of that judgment was filed in the New York County
Clerk's office and, -via a transcript then issued by the latter, the
judgment was docketed in the Suffolk County Clerk's office the
114 Greyhound Corp. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 14 N.Y.2d

380, 200 N.E.2d 625, 251 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1964).
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following day. That same day the Sheriff of Suffolk County received an execution issued by plaintiff's attorney out of the civil
court, whifh was directed to the sheriff of any county. On June 5
the Suffolk Sheriff levied on the personal property of the defendant.11 6
On the defendant's motion to vacate the levy the court held
that the execution was void since an execution issued by the New
York City Civil Court may not be executed outside of the city.
The court referred to CCA § 701(a) which provides that all
processes and mandates of the New York City Civil Court may be
served, unless otherwise provided, only within the City of New
York. In addition, CCA § 1504 provides that executions of that
court are directed to the marshals within the city. The court
deemed these provisions controlling.
However, a strong argument may be made on plaintiff's behalf
that would reflect more accurately, than the instant decision, the
present liberal attitude toward the effect of procedural defects upon
substantive rights. Plaintiff's main contention is that the captioning
of the execution in civil court is an irregularity only and that,
since he could have issued a supreme court execution, such irregularity should not support a motion to vacate the levy. In support
of this contention plaintiff indicated that defendant had not been
prejudiced by the irregularity.
The CPLR's attitude toward such an irregularity is clear.
Section 2001 provides that an irregularity may be disregarded if
no substantive rights of a party are prejudiced.
While truly jurisdictional defects are not curable under CPLR
2001, it would ao)vear that the defect at bar should not be considered jurisdictional. The defect boiled down to the use of a wrong
word in the place of the proper word. The wrong word. was
"Civil"; the proper word was "Supreme." The place of its appearance was apparently in the caption of the execution.
The salient point here is that the execution issues without any
court application whatever. The attorney himself issues it and the
only defect at bar is that he captioned it "Civil Court" instead of
"Supreme Court." The filing of the transcript with the county
clerk made the judgment one of the supreme court under CPLR
5018(a), and the attorney was thereafter authorized, without more,
to issue a supreme court execution. He negligently captioned the
paper "Civil Court" instead of "Supreme Court"; the defendant
could in no wise have been prejudiced by that sole oversight. A
different conclusion would be in order if no transcript had been
filed, because there would have been no riqht to issue execution
out of the supreme court in such case. But the right having
accrued by virtue of the transcript filing, the mistaken caption116 American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Seaboard Die Casting Corp., 43 Misc.
2d 781. 252 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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especially after accepted and acted upon by the Suffolk Sheriff,
who would appear to be the only one so positioned as to
refuse an execution improperly captioned-thereafter fell into
the category of mere irregularity and would, under present law
and the liberal intent underlying it, have been best disregarded. A
great deal of time and effort, involving considerable expense, was
overturned at bar because, at bottom, of use of the wrong word.
CPLR 2001 could reasonably have been held to control here, with
the irregularity being ignored. The court might have so held had
the foregoing factors been called to its attention.
ARTICLE

23-SBPoENAs, OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS

Party applying for issuance of arbitrator'ssubpoena is proper
party to petition for judicial enforcement thereof.
Petitioner moved pursuant to CPLR 2308(b) to compel compliance with a subpoena which had been issued by an arbitrator
at the request of petitioner and served upon respondent. Respondent contended that only the "issuer may move . . .to compel compliance"117 with the subpoena and that the issuer here was the
arbitrator and not petitioner.118
The court, in a brief opinion, indicated that respondent's
contention was clearly incorrect and that the term "issuer" embraces
the one who applied for the subpoena in a nonjudicial proceeding.
The order of compliance issued upon petitioner's application was
therefore valid, and respondent's disobedience of it punishable by
contempt. The instant application for a warrant of commitment
against respondent for disobeying that order was granted.
ARTICLE 30-

REMEDIES AND PLEADINGS

CPLR 3017(a) - Judgment may be rendered on the proof, though
relief of different nature than that prayed for.
Nowak v. Wereszynski"09 involved a proceeding in the nature
of mandamus, instituted by the Comptroller of the City of Utica,
in order to compel the Common Council of the City to adopt a
budget providing for the transfer of certain funds by the water
board to the city. Special term denied the petition and directed
that respondents prepare a new estimate with the objectionable
funds deleted therefrom. In addition, the Common Council, upon
the receipt of such estimate, was directed to adopt a new budget.
Appellant-Comptroller contended that the relief granted was improper,
since it was not requested in the pleadings. The appellate division,
CPLR

2308(b).
117
113 Application of

Nelson, 43 Misc. 2d 132, 249 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
11921 App. Div. 2d 427, 250 N.Y.S.2d 981 (4th Dep't 1964).

